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ABSTRACT
The Navy with its historical and present emphasis on de-
veloping subordinates through increased responsibility and
authority, can not afford leadership training which is inef-
fective. The research developed in this study seeks to pro-
vide information on one management tactic, delegation. The
study is based upon the competency model developed by McBer
for the Navy's Leadership Management Education and Training
(LMET) program.
A review of the historical thought on delegation from the
classical to the neoclassical writers is presented. Also dis-
cussed is the background on the development of LMET.
The research was conducted utilizing the techniques
originated by McBer in their study for the Navy. This thesis
sought to find if the specific competency of delegation is
more often demonstrated by superior Navy personnel and if
LMET training has any significant impact upon managerial
effectiveness and the use of delegation.
The results of the study found no significant relation-
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Early in December 19 81, Dr. Miguel Tirado and Dr. Richard
McGonigal, at the Naval Postgraduate School, formed a research
group consisting of seven Naval Postgraduate School students,
one research assistant, and themselves in a project titled,
"Improved Management Training for a Heterogeneous Work Force".
This study was conducted under the auspices of the Human Re-
sources Management Program, Navy Military Personnel Command,
Washington, D.C.
Basically the project's objective was to provide studies,
analysis, and training in support of the current management
and planning in regard to the Navy's Human Resource Management
System. The objective of this initial phase was to determine
what distinguished a superior from an average manager of a
heterogeneous work group. In doing so the study would clarify
and compare the specific management competencies to the basic
sixteen competencies validated in the 19 79 McBer study [Ref.
1: p. 134] .
A second phase of the study, that did not involve the
graduate students, would take the newly identified competen-
cies and provide valuable insights and instructional guides
for the Human Resource Management and LMET programs to address
current needs for management training in these competencies.
Competencies are personal qualities and skills which are
related to effective or competent performance of a job.

During the data collection which consisted of interviews
with the study's sample, a recurring theme emerged which in-
volved the chain of command, specifically over the use and
nonuse of delegation. When considering the Navy's complex
and rapidly advancing technological environment and tighten-
ing resource constraints, it would seem that managers would
have a greater necessity to delegate some of their responsi-
bilities to their subordinates.
The purpose of this thesis is to look at the delegation compe-
tency. Specifically, is there a relationship .between the use
of delegation and managerial effectiveness? Also, does
graduating from the Leadership Management Education and
Training (LMET) program have any significant impact upon
2
managerial effectiveness and the use of delegation?
It is felt that these are important questions to be
answered due to the historical and present emphasis the Navy
has placed on developing subordinates through increased
responsibility and authority, as exemplified by the following
statement:
What am I looking for especially from all of us? Well,
I'm looking for things like delegation of authority
down through the chain of command to the lowest compe-
tent level. I'm looking for junior officers and divi-
sion officers who will employ the chain of command to
perfection, challenging senior petty officers to assume
o
Leadership Management Education and Training (LMET) is
the Navy's course directed at teaching management skills
and techniques to petty officers and officers. A complete
background of LMET is discussed in Chapter II, Sections
B-D.

an increased leadership role within the division, and
giving them the authority to do so .
3
It is also important because the Navy cannot afford to
continually obligate manpower and financial resources into a
program which may not be effective when those resources could
be better utilized in manning and purchasing necessary
equipment
.
The thesis is divided into six major chapters. The first
chapter is the introduction. The second is a brief histori-
cal review of the topic of delegation. It also provides a
background of the original McBer study and the development
of the LMET program which followed.
Chapter three discusses the methodology that was used in
the heterogeneous work group project. It is a description of
the preparations for data gathering, pre-arrangements con-
ducted with the study's sample, and the methods used to
analyze the data.
The fourth chapter provides some detailed information about
the specific competency of delegation. This chapter provides
how the competency was defined by the study group and exam-
ples of how the competency was used differently by superior
and average performers.
The fifth chapter presents a description of the data and
the data analyses
.
3Excerpt from a statement by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward,
Chief of Naval Operations, 9 January 19 81.
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Conclusions from the study are in Chapter six, after
which an assessment of the study and recommendations for





Before discussing the specifics of this project, it would
be helpful to have a brief review of the concept of delegation
within the management sciences arena. Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary defines the verb, to delegate, as, "to entrust
one's authority to another, to appoint as one's representa-
tive, or to assign responsibility or authority" [Ref. 2:
p. 29 7], This is a sufficient definition for common uses,
but it lacks the depth and distinction required by management
science
.
The development of the Management Sciences provoked studies
of authority and its uses. While delegation is normally con-
sidered within this sphere, it has been disheartening to note
the lack of specificity with which classical theorists treat
the topic. Max Weber writes about "strictly delimited"
authority and systems of rules which are intended to add order
to bureaucratic systems. He seems to envision delegation as
the tasking of an "office" to execute a job. Such an "office"
would be expected to perform every similar job that arises in
the future. This is a systematic delegation which is imper-
sonalized by the fact that the responsibility would be accorded
to the "office" and any of its incumbents, rather than to any
one individual because of personal traits or talents [Ref. 3:
p. 40-50]. While the U.S. Navy certainly exhibits the
12

Weberian type of delegation, this study intends to focus more
on the case by case, superior-to-subordinate, distribution
of power and responsibility.
Henri Fayol does no better with this subject in his classic
fourteen principles of management. He skirts the specific
delegation issue while alluding to it in the principles of
(2) authority and responsibility, (4) unity of command, and
(9) scalar chain. As with Weber, Fayol concerns himself with
systems in which positional delegation can occur, rather than
with the individualized action this thesis envisions [Ref..4:
p. 23-37]
.
Because of the thesis ' focus most of the rest of the
classical organizational theorists must be dismissed, as well.
Indeed, since "Herbert A. Simon could conclude in 19 57 that
'there is no consensus in management literature as to how the
term authority should be used'" [Ref. 5: p. 199], and since
the classical theorists speak largely about the delegation of
authority, any attempt to review the literature on delegation
would seem too involved in definitional problems to be of
significant value.
Much the same is true of the neo-classical writers, but
for the purposes of this thesis it is useful to note the dis-
tinctions made by Chester Barnard. He divided authority in
organizations into two parts, "authority of position" and
"authority of leadership". It is the "authority of position",
power because of one's place in the organizational hierarchy,
that Weber acknowledged, though Barnard did not refer to
13

Weber's writings. It is more the "authority of leadership",
power based on knowledge, ability, and understanding, which
we will explore [Ref. 6: p. 173-174]-. Moreover, we will look
not only at the authority to delegate, but also the authority
which is delegated.
The actual subject of delegation, particularly in the
individual sense, was not adequately addressed until the mid-
dle of the twentieth century. In 1949, Paul Selznick wrote
of "a control technique" called delegation. He specifically
referred to an increase in demand for control by top manage-
ment which led to instituting increased delegation of authority
Selznick then wrote about the consequences of increased dele-
gation, i.e., specialized training and a restriction of the
attention of the delegatee. Delegation, Selznick maintains,
narrows the recipients' organizational perspective to a sphere
which surrounds the immediate area of the delegated authority.
The "bifurcation of interests" follows, along with other con-
sequences. Yet, even with Selznick, delegation is viewed
within a system, showing some reference to individuals, but
attending more to the systematic advantages and disadvantages
of organizational delegation [Ref. 7: p. 36-47].
The study of delegation in the individual sense was
initiated with the study of leadership and management. In
1957, Donald and Eleanor Laird wrote what they believe is the
first book devoted entirely to the subject of delegation.
They attempt to separate the logical and economic factors from
14

human, psychological factors. For the most part they discuss
delegation from an experiential base, though they embellish
the text with psychological and social research. They do
emphasize the sharing of decision making as well as work de-
tails in a manner similar to that which we will later be
discussing.
In the Lairds' description, they propose some conditions
which are conducive to delegating:
The records indicate that delegating works most success-
fully, in general, when the human climate is democratic,
permissive, equalitarian, not secretive, not smothering.
In such a climate the person delegated to feels that he
is an associate rather than a subordinate, and also
feels that he is sharing purposes with his chief, not
merely going through motions the chief prescribes.
[Ref. 8: p. 20]
The Lairds also stress symptoms of over/under-delegating,
the relationship between delegation and efficiency/effective-
ness, when not to delegate, and to whom one should delegate.
In 1965, Gardner and Davis wrote, "survival (of managers)
depends upon the successful utilization of employee ability.
The manager cannot 'do it all* himself. If he is to be a
successful manager, he must get his work done through others.
He must define organizational objectives, ensure that they
are understood, and fix responsibility for their achievement;
in short, he must delegate " [Ref. 9: p. xi] . Interestingly,
this reference is from a programmed text which has the focus
of teaching individuals how to delegate--in much the same
manner as this study will later refer to the term. As proposed
by the authors 12 years ago, delegation is still a distinguishing
15

competency of good managers and there are still attempts to
train people in the skill.
Many elements of delegation were enumerated by Dale
McConkey in 19 74. He stated in depth delegation takes place
when the manager is given the widest possible latitude to
determine his own destiny in the following areas [Ref. 10:
p. 13]:
1. Responsibility : jurisdiction or scope of his job
2. Accountability : specific results he must achieve
3. Planning : doing the planning for his own organiza-
tional unit
4. Authority : having the authority necessary to make
the decisions and take the action appropriate to his job
5. Decision making : making the decisions that need to
be made for his unit
6
.
Directing : within a minimal monitoring or control
system, being left alone to direct and manage his own
organization and its resources
7. Monitoring : receiving the tailor-made feedback and
data necessary to plan for his operation, monitor its progress,
and take corrective action as required.
These areas are quite useful for examining delegation in a
leadership/management framework as this thesis will do when
examining LMET and the McBer models
.
B. LMET BACKGROUND
Harvard professor David C. McClelland and psychologist
David Berlew organized McBer and Company in 19 70. In 19 76
16

they started working on the development of the Navy's LMET
program in fulfillment of a contract awarded the previous
year.
McClelland, a respected clinical psychologist, is well
known for his research on power, affiliation, and achievement
motives [Ref. 11: p. 35-46]. He wrote a book, The Achieving
Society , in which he discussed the need for achievement and
its impact on society's economic growth. Through achievement
and economic development man would be better equipped to
chart his own destiny [Ref. 12]
.
After researching and becoming convinced of the achieve-
ment motive, McClelland sought to understand how the motive
was acquired. Following his various motive development pro-
grams of training throughout the world, McClelland wrote,
"....rather than developing 'all purpose' treatments, good
for any person and any purpose, it (psychotherapy) should aim
to develop specific treatments or educational programs built
on laboriously accumulated detailed knowledge of the charac-
teristic to be changed" [Ref. 13: p. 333]. McBer used the
research on the motive development program to later build the
Navy's LMET program.
Due to his research he did not believe that traditional
type personnel testing was an adequate measure of an indivi-
dual's future success. This was made most evident in 19 71,
when he criticized the intelligence and aptitude test commu-
nity in a lecture given at the Educational Testing Service
17

in Princeton, New Jersey [Ref. 14: p. 1-4]. He had made some
of the same criticisms 15 years earlier while serving on The
Social Science Research Council Committee on Early Identifi-
cation of Talent [Ref. 15]. His key issue was the validity
of the intelligence and aptitude tests that were in vogue at
the time. He granted that test scores correlated highly with
grades in school, but were grades a valid predictor of success
in life? He argued that good test scores allow people to
get into better schools, but after graduation both good and
poor test scorers succeed and fail. He suggested that other
talents or competencies should be used to determine college
entrance. These new criteria should not be "grades in school"
but "grades in life" [Ref. 14: p. 7]. He was not alone in
his beliefs as other researchers had found evidence that sup-
ported his criticism [Refs. 16, 17, 18].
Having criticized the testing community, McClelland pro-
vided his audience six principles for an alternative approach
to traditional intelligence testing. Although all six were
used in the formation of the Navy's LMET program, the follow-
ing three played a special part in its development:
1. Criterion sampling
2. Tested characteristics are made public and explicit
3. Assess competencies involved in cluster of life outcomes
The first principle concerned criterion sampling which
McClelland described in the following manner:
Criterion sampling means that testers have got to get
out of their offices where they play endless word and
18

paper-and-pencil games and into the field where they
actually analyze performance into its components.
[Ref. 14: p. 7]
Criterion sampling is thus based upon observing a person at
a task or job and then analyzing how well that person performed,
He points out that academic skill tests have been success-
ful in the past because they involve criterion sampling. For
instance, the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) taps skills that
the teacher is looking for and will give good grades for.
The trouble came about, McClelland says when people started
to wrongly assume that these tests could be more generally
applied in predicting other abilities, such as being a compe-
tent doctor or a successful businessman.
The second principle is that in order to improve on a
characteristic tested it should be made public and explicit.
This principle sharply conflicted with the practice of the
testing movement. Testers, supported by the American Psycholo-
gists Association (APA) Ethics Committee, tried to keep
answers to many of their tests a secret in order to prevent
people from practicing and learning to do better on them or
faking high scores. McClelland stated, "Faking a high score
is impossible if you are performing criterion behavior, as in
tests for reading, spelling or driving a car. Faking becomes
possible the more indirect the connection is between the test
behavior and the criterion behavior" [Ref. 14: p. 9]. For
example, doing analogies is a task that is incorporated in the
SAT and one that predicts good grades in school fairly well.
Since school work usually does not involve the use of analogies
19

psychologists have had to become security conscious over the
test. They fear that if students get hold of the test answers,
the students might practice and then "fake" high aptitude.
McClelland notes that what is meant by faking is that doing
well on analogies is not part of the criterion behavior (getting
good grades) , or else it could be hardly be considered testing.
The third principle is that tests should assess competen-
cies involved in clusters of life outcomes. In order to avoid
the problem of compiling hundreds of specific criterion sampling
for one job, McClelland suggests it may be desirable to assess
competencies that are more generally useful in clusters of
life outcomes. He notes that tests must not only focus on
the occupational outcomes but also social ones as well, such
as leadership and interpersonal skills. He provides descrip-
tions of four social competencies: communication skills,
patience, moderate goal setting, and ego development [Ref. 14:
p. 10-11],
C. LMET DEVELOPMENT
In 19 75 McBer and Company was selected to develop a leader-
ship and management education program for the Navy. McBer '
s
primary aim was to identify the important criteria of non-
technical leadership and management performance for commissioned
officers (division officer, department head, executive offi-
cer) and non-commissioned officers (petty officer, leading
petter officer, leading chief petty officer, and master chief
petty officer) [Ref. 19: p. 7]. In order to do this 59
20

commissioned officers and 2 3 non-commissioned officers were
interviewed from the Pacific Fleet at San Diego, California.
McBer asked the commanding officers of each interviewee to
rate the individual as a superior or an average performer.
Ratings were received on 33 commissioned officers and 18 non-
commissioned officers with 30 being identified as superior
and 21 as average performers. The same procedures were used
to draw a sample from the Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, Virginia,
where 38 superior and 40 average performers were identified
[Ref . 1: p. 4] .
Interview data was collected through a technique called
Behavior Event Interviewing (BEI) . This technique gets the
interviewee to relate some critical incidents, that is, impor-
tant success and failure experiences they had in their present
positions. They are specifically requested to describe in
considerable detail the following items:
1. The situation and what led up to it.
2. Who was involved.
3. What the interviewee felt, wanted or intended in the
situation.
4. What the interviewee actually did in the situation.
5. What others actually did.
6. The results of this action.
Klemp and Spencer describe how the BEI differs from other
interview techniques in the following ways:
1. It is a probing strategy rather than a standard
set of questions. It provides the opportunity for




2. It is investigative, not reflective. The object is
to find out what occurred not what the respondent
thinks he should or might have done under similar
circums tances
.
3. It presses the interviewee to provide information
on their actual behavior—thoughts and actions—and
not what they conclude it takes to do their job.
[Ref. 20: p. 1]
Trained BEI interviewers can thus find out what people
actually do rather than what they espouse to do. Another
advantage is that it focuses on what people do that is most
important for job success, social as well as technical
knowledge and skill factors.
The BEI method is not new. John Flanigan developed an
interview procedure during World War II which he called the
critical incident technique. This technique came about
through his inquiry on the reasons for failures of bombing
missions during the war. He asked combat veterans to des-
cribe incidents that involved behavior which impacted on the
success or failure in accomplishing their missions [Ref. 21:
Chapter IV]
.
The BEI interviews that McBer conducted were recorded
verbatim and later behavior criteria that superior and aver-
age performers differed on were identified into 2 7 competen-
cies and grouped into 5 clusters [Ref. 19: p. 15]. The
interviews from the Atlantic Fleet were used to cross-validate
the findings found in the Pacific Fleet. This was done by
trained personnel who scored each interview as one from a
superior or average performer based on the competencies found
22

in the Pacific Fleet. The scoring was done in the blind, that
is scorers had no knowledge if an individual was rated
superior or average by their commanding officer.
A second technique was used in the validation process.
This technique consisted of a paper-and-pencil test developed
to measure the competencies over a much larger population.
This test was administered to over 1000 officers and enlisted
personnel from both fleets and who held billets from petty
officer through commanding officer [Ref. 1: p. 6].
Following the validation process sixteen of the twenty-
seven competencies were found to be associated with superior
leadership and management performance. These sixteen compe-
tencies shown in Table I, were to become the basis for the
development of the instructional format of LMET [Ref. 22:
p. 8] .
D. LMET COURSE DESIGN
LMET formally started in 19 78 and is now being taught at
Memphis, Tennessee; Little Creek, Virginia; Mayport, Florida;
Pensacola, Florida; Newport, Rhode Island; Charleston, South
Carolina; Coronado, California; San Diego, California;
Treasure Island, California; Bangor, Washington; and Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii [Ref. 23: p. 35]. Instructors are taught at
a 12-week instructor course at the Human Resources and Manage-
ment School in Memphis, Tennessee. Personnel must complete





1. Efficiency and Effectiveness
* Setting goals and performance standards
' * Taking initiatives
2
.




y * Develops subordinates
* Self-control
3 Advising and Counseling
9
i * Positive expectations
^ * Realistic expectations
o * Understanding
4 Management Control
* Plans and organizes







Each LMET track is tailored toward a particular leader-
ship and management level: executive officer, division offi-
cer, chief petty officer and petty officer.
At each level there is differing emphasis on the sixteen
competencies. This is because at each management level cer-
tain clusters are utilized more frequently and are more crit:
cal to superior performance than others. For example, the
24

executive officer track may spend more classroom time on the
influence cluster than the division officer track.
The program for the officers are further subdivided with
separate courses for specific specialities: aviation, sub-
marine, and surface warfare officers. All courses are team
taught by two or three contemporaries, i.e., aviation offi-
cers teaching the aviation LMET course and chief petty offi-
cers instructing the chief petty officer LMET course.
The one week executive officer course and the two week
course for the other tracks present the students with leader-
ship and management principles and skills that were identi-
fied in the McBer competency model that differentiate superior
from average performers. Each course takes the students
through a five step process:
1. Recognition . Each competency is introduced to the
student in terms of desired skills, knowledge, attitudes,
etc. This step utilizes material adapted from actual inci-
dents collected in the BEI.
2. Understanding . Each participant translates what he
has learned in the previous step into a language of his own.
3. Self-assessment in relating to the competency . Each
student identifies his personal strengths and weaknesses
through recognizing the value of the skills, attitudes and
personal qualities necessary in their own jobs and careers.
4. Skill acquisition and practice . Participants practice
all skills identified in each competency with emphasis on
those that each feels improvement is needed.
2 5

5. Job application . Participants develop action plans
to apply the newly acquired knowledge and skills to their
jobs [Ref . 1: p. 10 ]
.
During this training, skills and knowledge are developed
through lectures, case studies, role plays, films and exer-
cises. By using these many different learning styles, a
more productive atmosphere for individuals to learn and ex-




A. HETEROGENEOUS WORKFORCE PROJECT DESIGN
The design of the heterogeneous workforce project was
based on McBer's methodology that developed LMET. The object
of the heterogenous workforce project was to identify the
important leadership and management competencies in a selected
sample of commissioned and non-commissioned officers who
supervised a diverse work group. A diverse work group was
considered one which was characterized by racial and ethnic
diversity, male-female composition and by civilian-military
distribution. The presence of one or more of these dimensions
of heterogeneity was used to differentiate those work groups
in the study. The procedure utilized to identify these com-
petencies were conducted in the following sequence:
1. Orientation and training of the research team in the
McBer Behavior Event Interview technique
2
.
Selection of the Sample
3. Conduct of the Data Collection
4 Development of the Competency Model
5 Coding of the Data
6. Analyzing the Data.
As in any research study there are constraints which must
be addressed by the researchers early in the development of
the study. Two major obstacles of this study were time and
personnel availability. The research proposal submitted by
27

the project directors estimated a time period of 1 October
19 81 to 30 June 1982. This was later proven to be unattain-
4
able as the project developed. During this period the re-
search team was to be formed and trained, the data collected,
the model conceived, the data analyzed, and the final results
written. The problem was compounded when the sponsoring
activity requested the study be extended toward The Women
in Ships Program.
This occurred at a time the data collection was nearing
the completion date. Besides extending the data collection
period it also had a ripple effect upon the coding and analy-
sis phases of the study by increasing the sample size from
75 to 104 people.
The other constraint of resource availability also tied
in with timing. As mentioned previously seven graduate stu-
dents were involved in this project. These students were
in their third and fourth quarter of a six quarter curriculum
carrying an average of 20 quarter hours. It proved to be a
demanding schedule for them between their graduate studies
and the time required for the travel to and from the data
collection sites and the actual collection of the data.
Federal law prohibited Navy women from serving on board
other than Navy transports and hospital ships. The Women
in Ships program came about due to a congressional change
in law in which women could be assigned to selected non-
combatant ships for normal tours of duty and to any class
of ships on temporary additional duty, provided the ship
is not in combat.
28

The study was also dependent upon the availability of
commands in which samples could be extracted. This topic
is addressed later in detail.
B. ORIENTATION AND TRAINING OF THE RESEARCH TEAM
The technique (investigative-interviewing) is an
essential component of McBer's Job Competence
Assessment (JCA) , which defines the critical skills
needed for job success and identifies the indi-
viduals who possess those skills in high degree.
[Ref. 20: p. 1]
During the week of 10-14 January 19 82, the research team
participated in a workshop conducted at the Naval Post-
2graduate School by a McBer consultant. The workshop was
designed as an intensive two day experience but due to the
graduate students ' class schedules critical incident inter-
view training was conducted in six three hour blocks
scattered throughout the week.
The first three-hour block was to orient the team on the
background of the job competency model developed by McBer
for the Navy's LMET program and how the research project
would extend the initial study by focusing on the diverse
work groups impact on that model. Also addressed at this
time were the procedures and the structure of conducting
the McBer BEI.
2Steve Newbert, a graduate of the Harvard Graduate School
of Business Administration, was very familiar with the
Navy's competency model and LMET program. He managed the
development and implementation of the Navy's 12-week LMET
instructor program and was currently involved in a project
to identify competencies of outstanding technical instruc-
tors and recruit company commanders for the Navy.
29

The second and third three-hour block concentrated on
conducting an actual interview. Each member interviewed
another while the others watched, listened, and took notes
on their observations. The interview was recorded and was
approximately 4 5 minutes in length. After the interview
was completed the interviewee was asked to provide his
impression of the interview. For example, was he made com-
fortable by the interviewer? Were all his questions about
the interview answered sufficiently and clearly by the inter-
viewer? Were the interviewer's instructions made understand-
able? This was followed by a self evaluation from the
interviewer. The interviewer evaluated himself on the
specific procedures of the BEI methodology. The group than
provided additional constructive feedback which was then
added to and summarized by the McBer consultant. This proc-
ess was continued for all workshop participants.
The fourth three-hour block was devoted to a general
analysis by the consultant of the workshop participants
'
strengths and weaknesses. He also at this time provided
additional support and advice on how all participants could
increase the effectiveness of their interviewing techniques.
The remaining time was used to orient the participants on
the coding of the BEI.
The final two three-hour workshop meetings were second
practice sessions on the critical incident interview technique
This phase was conducted the same as the first, except each
participant interviewed a different team member.
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The workshop participants were then tasked to arrange an
interview with a non-workshop participant who was not familiar
with the BEI technique. This interview was to be conducted
utilizing all the training received from the workshop. The
interview was recorded and later sent to McBer where it was
evaluated by the staff of McBer for individual certification
in the BEI technique. The evaluation was reflective of the
same criteria as discussed and demonstrated during the work-
shop. The McBer reviewer provided detailed feedback on the
quality- and completeness of each incident in the interview.
All participants received certification on the first sub-
3
mission of their interview tapes.
C. SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE
The research plan was to obtain a wide ranging sample
of various shore, air and fleet commands. These commands
were drawn from the three geographical areas: San Diego,
California; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and San Francisco,
California.
The sample was composed of personnel in the grades of
E-5 and E-6 (Petty Officer) , E-7 through E-9 (Chief Petty
Officer) , and 0-1 through 0-4 (Division Officer) who were
managing a diverse work group.
3Although there were seven graduate students involved
in the study only six participated in the workshop and
were eventually certified. The seventh person joined the
group at a later date. She received training in the BEI




Initially the research assistant would contact an HRMC
(Human Resource Management Command) or HRMD (Human Resource
Management Detachment) personally or telephonically on the
project and request their assistance in the selection of a
command to provide a sample. The actual selection of the
command was left to the discretion of the HRMC or HRMD.
The only guidance given to the HRMC or HRMD was that the
sample command be composed of supervisors of diverse work
groups. Undoubtedly, a major consideration which determined
the command that was sampled was their workload at that
time and for ships whether they were in port and available
for interviews.
Approximately two weeks prior to the interview the HRMC
or HRMD was called to nominate a sample command. Once the
command was identified and a point of contact was provided,
a research assistant contacted the command. The research
assistant explained to the point of contact, usually the
executive officer, the purpose of the proposed visit, what
was needed from the command, and the time period involved.
The HRMC or HRMD generally briefed the commands sufficiently
beforehand that there were no real problems encountered at
this time. Dates, times, and necessary resources were later
confirmed prior to the team's arrival.
The actual selection of the personnel who were to partici-
pate was usually determined by the executive officer of the
command. Guidance given to the executive officer was that
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the study would use a number of officers and petty officers
who supervised a diverse work group and varied in the charac-
teristics of ethnic background, LMET/non-LMET graduate, and
gender. The latter was sometimes not obtainable as in cases
in which commands had no females, such as in certain types
of naval vessels. Although it is not known what actual cri-
teria were used by the executive officer in his selection
process, generally the sample provided was similar to that
requested.
D. DATA COLLECTION
Once a command was selected and administrative matters
were confirmed (when, where, who, and why) the research
team set out to the command on the specified date. Due to
the emphasis placed on preparing the command for the team's
entry and also the time spent on insuring that all details
were taken care of prior to our arrival, the officer of the
deck or in the case of shore facilities, the point of con-
tact, was normally waiting for the team's arrival. After
the necessary introductions and during a brief welcoming the
research assistant would receive the CO's evaluation of each
interviewee whether he was a superior or average performer.
This was to become a part of a process which identified how
superior and average performers differed in their utiliza-
tion of certain management competencies. In order to achieve
more reliability on the CO's evaluation, the interviewers
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were required to rate their respondents as superior or
average after the completion of the interview.
It should be noted that each interviewer did his evalua-
tion in the blind. He did not know how the CO evaluated his
respondent. Although each interviewer was provided general
characteristics to assist him in making an evaluation, i.e.,
bearing, speech, confidence, content of interview, it came
down to the "gut" reaction of the interviewer. This infor-
mation was later checked for reliability during the coding
phase and later served an important part in the analysis of
the data.
The BEI was the exclusive data collection tool. The
procedures and techniques described in the Orientation and
Training phase were utilized throughout the collection of
data period. It is not known how much error can be attri-
buted to individual differences in interview techniques,
interview bias in the number or in the positive or negative
outcome of incidents recorded, and the extent to which inci-
dents reported actually measure respondent skills. Research
by Finkle (1950) indicates that variation in the questions
used to elicit critical incidents does not significantly
affect subjects responses [Ref. 24: p. 291-297],
Each interview was conducted in a private room on a one
to one basis. It was requested that the room be in a quiet
location away from distractions but in some cases this was
not possible. For example, a few of the sampled vessels were
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in port and were undergoing repairs or replenishment. The
problem from noise had a negligible impact upon the collec-
tion of data as only 6 interviews had to be eliminated due
to the poor quality of recording..
Each interview was approximately 1 1/2 hours in length
and was recorded verbatim. These recordings were later
transcribed in entirety. There was no significant problem
of gaining the respondent's permission to have the interview
taped. This was due to the emphasis placed on insuring that
the interviewee understood why he was selected, the purpose
of the study and the maintenance of confidentiality on the
part of the research team.
It was the goal that each interviewer probe for equal
numbers of positive and negative incidents. There was some
variation to this because of interviewee preferences and
experiences.
E. BUILDING THE COMPETENCY MODEL
After the data collection was completed the group met
with the McBer consultant to formulate and build a competency
model
.
Prior to the consultant's arrival each individual analyzed
four transcripts utilizing the LMET model of sixteen compe-
tencies developed by McBer. The task was to read through
the transcripts identifying managerial actions based on those
sixteen competencies and also on any new ones respondent's
utilized. Each member was asked to make a list of effective
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actions taken to include the page number of the transcript
from which each action was found. This was to generate a
means for discussion and also to provide a support base as
the model was formed.
On 6 and 7 May the group worked with the consultant to
build the project's competency model. The initial procedure
was to "brainstorm" those behavioral indicators that each
individual found in his analysis. As each action was written
on a chalkboard it was sometimes redefined in more concise
terminology through examples and dialogue among the project
participants
.
The next phase was to identify any actions which were
brought out in the "brainstorm" period that could be inte-
grated into another or dropped due to duplication. This also
provided a period in which the participants could more clearly
visualize the formation of the model and add other competen-
cies or behavioral indicators which were overlooked during
the "brainstorm" phase.
This led to the actual model building stage. Working at
first from the sixteen competencies, the team consolidated
those actions that they felt fit under the sixteen competen-
cies of the LMET program. As each of the sixteen competen-
cies were discussed and reviewed the scope of the competency
was often changed. Any change was dependent upon the des-
cription of the actions taken during each incident. From
these actions behavioral indicators for each competency were
developed. After all sixteen competencies were reviewed
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and behavioral indicators were ascribed to each, the focus
was placed upon those actions taken by the interviewees that
did not adequately fit within the LMET model. At this point
team members presented supportive incidents from interviews
to draw a consensus if another competency was necessary.
If the competency was found necessary a description of the
competency was developed through a list of behavioral
indicators
.
The final result was that four competencies were added
to the sixteen of the LMET model. The four new competen-
cies that were conceptualized were: self-confidence, low
fear of rejection, appreciation for human diversity and
genuine concern for people. Also included were two thres-
hold skills: concern for achievement and concern for influ-
ence. These two threshold skills were also part of the
sixteen competencies of the LMET model. Threshold skills
are those competency elements which do not significantly
differentiate superior from average performers, but which
tend to be observed in most competent personnel and are
deemed necessary for adequate performance. For the benefit
of developing training course and teaching material at a
later date these twenty-two competencies were grouped into
six clusters (Table II)
.
F. CODING
A total of 94 interviews were coded, producing 406




Competencies of Managers of Heterogeneous Work Groups
1. Strong Self-Concept
* Self-confidence
* Low fear of rejection




* Concern for achievement
* Sets goals and performance standards
* Takes initiative
3. Management Control
* Plans and organizes





4 Skillful Use of Influence





5 Advising and Counseling








team was divided into pairs. Each pair had three main
objectives:
1. To code all interviews assigned to each individual
for competencies and behavioral indicators.
2. To code the other team members 1 transcripts and
reconcile the differences.
3. To identify incidents that provided good evidence of
certain themes.
The process started by each pair receiving their assigned
copies of transcripts, codebooks, and codesheet matrix
forms. Once these were received, each individual read a
copy of his assigned transcript to familiarize himself with
the incidents and to identify and record locations of inci-
dents dealing with specified subjects. The transcript was
then reread for coding purposes. Using predetermined coding
rules, each transcript was coded and page numbers for the
best examples of each theme were recorded.
After each individual coded his assigned transcripts on
the left margin, the transcripts were given to the other
team member for coding. This time the second coder coded
on the right margin while covering up the left. This in-
sured that the coders were independently coding each trans-
cript. It should also be mentioned that the coders were
responsible for identifying each transcript as belonging to
o. superior or average performer. Thus, the superior and
average performers were identified through inter-rater
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reliability of the Commanding Officer, interviewer, and
coders.
Each team met to discuss their coding, to reconcile
their differences, and to arrive at a consensus for each
interview transcript. A master copy of each transcript
and the matrix codesheet reflected all coding conducted by
each pair. Data from the matrix codesheets of each pair
of coders was then transferred to a large competency fre-
quency sheet which served as the basis for the input of
raw data into the computer.
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IV. THE DELEGATION COMPETENCY
A. DEFINITION
The delegation competency was one of six competencies
that made up the management control cluster. The delega-
tion competency was defined as "using the chain of command
to get subordinates to take responsibility by any of the
following behavioral means":
1. Clearly assigns authority to others for task
accomplishments
.
2. Uses the chain of command to get subordinates to
share in task management.
3. Through methods other than direct orders, encourages
people to seek task-management responsibility.
4. Controls the urge to "do it yourself" and, instead
manages others to carry out the responsibilities which
have been assigned to them.
The key factor that distinguishes this definition is
that delegation must be behaviorally determined. It re-
quires human action or communication. A description of
the competency, through examples of critical incidents
involving each behavioral indicator is presented in the
next section.
D. DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPETENCY
The first behavioral indicator, "Clearly assigns
authority to others for task accomplishment", represents
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the transference of power (authority) from the holder to
the entrusted representative. This behavioral indicator
differs from the one McBer describes in the LMET model as:
"Clearly assigning responsibility for task accomplishment
to others" [Ref. 1: p. 25]. McBer uses "responsibility"
while this indicator utilizes "authority". In order for
individuals in the organization to perform their assigned
tasks effectively, they must be delegated sufficient authority
to carry out those tasks. This distinction between "authority"
and "responsibility" insures that the person delegated to
is provided the necessary power to carry out their assigned
duties. The following portion of a critical incident illus-
trates how the behavioral indicator was used by a superior
performer after failing to locate a submarine's signature
during an exercise mission.
We were both a little embarrassed about it. But I
didn't let it get us down. I had this talk with him
(person responsible for identifying and fixing the
submarine's signature) and decided who is going to make
which calls. I delegated out the responsibility. I
was still responsible for the whole mission, but I
let it be understood that it was his call. I said,
'I'll try to talk you out of it, but it's your call.
If I try to talk you out of it and you're sure it's
it, tell me to eat (#%!) and bark at the moon. That's
it and I'll take your word for it.'
A submarine signature is a set of sound characteris-
tics unique to a particular vessel. Once these character-
istics are placed on file they can be compared to a live
sonar sound pickup by an experienced technician and the
vessel identified in much the same way as a signature can
be attributed to a particular person.
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It is apparent in this situation how the use of "authority"
has extended the role of "responsibility" by the user in his
interaction with his superior and the task at hand.
The second behavioral indicator, "Uses the chain of
command to get subordinates to share in task management", is
a management tactic that seeks the cooperation between two
or more parties toward a set goal or standard. During the
review of the transcripts it was found that managers who
demonstrated this indicator generally employed various
implementation strategies. One manager after several unsuc-
cessful attempts to influence his subordinate to delegate
some of the individual's responsibilities, consciously over-
delegated to overwhelm his subordinate with additional tasks
and missions. Excerpts of what occurred afterwards follows:
Everytime we would talk about it (set up a training
program) he would say he was too busy and didn't have
the time for that. I brought it up again and he said,
'Yeah, yeah, you're right'. I then told him that I
wanted his subordinates ' supervisors to have more
responsibility and authority. He finally did that and
started delegating out a lot of those things that he
was trying to do himself. Basically that was what I
was trying to get him to do all along.
The next behavioral indicator is, "Through methods other
than direct orders, encourages people to seek task-management
responsibility". The critical point of this indicator is
the delegator urging his subordinate to take on additional
responsibility thus leading to shared ownership in the task.




The last division officer hadn't let him do anything.
He said, 'When something needs to be done, you come to
me and I'll tell you how it's going to be done'. So he
(the subordinate) didn't see any point in trying to
function as a Leading Petty Officer. A lot of talent
was wasted there. So when I got the people together,
I said, 'Alright you're going to be in charge of this
and you're going to be in charge of that. Now we got
to get it (preparing for an inspection) to work'. They
started to realize, 'I've got something 1 . One of the
things I did was to imply, 'This is yours'. If you
have a problem ask me. If you don't have a problem just
tell me what you're doing.
The final behavioral indicator, "Controls the urge to
'do it yourself and, instead manages others to carry out
the responsibilities which have been assigned to them", is
characterized by self-control of the delegator in order to
develop his subordinates through their successes and failures
in assigned tasks. The following incidents of how two offi-
cers managed a similar situation provides a contrast of the
use of this indicator. The first incident is from an average
performer who delegated responsibility to his CPO to write
a weekly information paper on what had occurred and what was
expected to occur while on deployment.
. . .He would work some more on it, although he was not
making any progress because he could not write very well
.
(After working on it a few more hours) . . .He handed it to
me. I read it over and changed pretty much 90% of it...
(Asked how the CPO reacted to this) ... He just accepted
it since I'm his boss. I'm sure he was not very happy
about it.... I ended up taking over this portion of the
CPO * s responsibility because whatever he wrote was a
waste of time. I would have to do the whole thing over
again anyhow.
The next incident involves a superior performer who held
his Leading Petty Officer responsible for writing coherent
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evaluation reports while battling the impulse to "do it
himself"
.
...Since he (former division officer) knew that the
leading petty officer couldn't do it, he was doing it
himself. I wasn't going to do that. (After eight
attempts by the petty officer to write the evaluations
on his subordinates, all were returned by the delegator.)
...I didn't know what to do, but at the same time he
was a first class petty officer and should have been able
to do it. My first reaction was to do it myself, but
then I'm not helping him any. So I kept returning them
until they were satisfactorily written.
One of the factors that influenced the use of this be-
havioral indicator was time. It was often seen in this study
that pressure to get a task or mission completed overrode
the desire to insure that subordinates carried out their
responsibilities. There may be various reasons for this
occurring. Based on the authors' experiences it seems to
center upon two key factors: the superior's evaluation of
the delegator in accomplishing the mission on time (fitness
reports) and also the extra time spent overseeing that the
delegated task is completed according to established stan-
dards. It comes to a matter of situational trade-off between
task completion or subordinate development, an important




A. THE ORIGINAL DATA
A research assistant hired by the Heterogeneous Workforce
project directors, reduced the original data and arranged
it as a file of incidents. The record for each incident
consisted of a data field for describing the interviewee
to whom the incident related, and another field for the
competencies which the coders ascribed to the incident.
Every behavioral indicator of each competency (78 total
behavioral indicators) had a character of information on the
record to denote its presence or absence in the incident.
This nominal arrangement of data applied to several of the
data elements in the description of the interviewees, as
well. Where the data was not nominal, ordinal values were
established.
Because the data described incidents, individual charac-
teristics (such as rate, age, sax, commander's vote on
superior/average, etc.) could appear in the file more than
once. Since some of the interviewees related as many as
nine incidents, their profiles would be quite heavily weighted
if statistics such as "LMET graduates' profiles" were calcu-
lated. The correction for this is found in the next section.
The file arranged as incidents did, however, permit an excel-
lent evaluation of which competencies were used in combination
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with each other and which may have taken prominence in inci-
dents of various themes.
For the study of delegation the subjects explored were:
how many incidents showed the use of any delegation, how many
times the four types of delegation were used in combination,
and how many critical incidents were experienced when the
interviewed supervisors did not delegate. Unfortunately,
the evaluation of whether the interviewee felt effective
or ineffective in the incidents was not coded, so conclusions
about the effectiveness of supervisors who used delegation
could not be drawn.
A total of 40 6 incidents were recorded. By using the
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) [Ref. 25:
p. 194-201, 218-245] several informative tables were pro-
duced. For instance, the number of times each type of dele-
gation was observed Cshown in Table III) was obtained by
using the "frequencies" procedure.
TABLE III
Incidents in Which Delegation was Coded
Behavioral
Indicator
A. Clearly Assigns Authority
B. Uses Chain of Command
C. Encourages Others—Avoids
Direct Orders









After using the "crosstabs" procedure and distilling
several tables of computer output to analyze the delegation
competency, it was found that when one behavioral indicator
of delegation was used other/ behavioral indicators of dele-
gation were less likely to be introduced into the same inci-
dent. This observation could be complicated by the fact
that when delegation was coded, a single appearance of the
competency could have been coded as two types—with parts
of each type being indistinguishable from other types.
Table IV shows how often the behavioral indicators appeared
in combination with one another.
TABLE IV
Behavioral Indicators— Used Alone or in Combinations
Behavioral Behavioral
Indicator ( s) Frequencyr Indicators Frequency
A (alone) 19 B + C 3
B (alone) 21 B + D 3
C (alone) 24 C + D 6
D (alone) 13 A + B + C 5
A + B 8 A + C + D 1
A + C 4 A + B + C + D 3
A + D 3
Times Behavioral Indicators Used Alone 77
Times Behavioral Indicators Used in Combinations 36
Times Delegation Competency Not IObserved 293
Total Incidents 40 6
* Behavioral Indicators are coded as follows:
A. Clearly Assigns Authority
B. Uses Chain of Command
C. Encourages Others—Avoids Direct Orders
D. Controls "Do it Yourself" Urge
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B. THE DATA AS REARRANGED
While this data is interesting, and could provide fertile
ground for further study, it does not really get at the ques-
tions of whether superior performers use delegation more than
average performers or whether LMET graduates use delegation
more than people who have not been schooled in LMET. To do
this, the data had to be rearranged as records which reflected
individuals' performances rather than incidents. Because
the other competencies were not in question, they were de-
leted when new records were created. One line of individual
attributes was retained for each interviewee. Five data
elements were added to this line: a number for how many
incidents were discussed by the interviewee, and a number
for each of the four delegation types which reflected how
many times that individual used that type of delegation.
This arrangement of data allowed a profile of the file based
on the individuals as depicted in the "frequency" and "cross-
tabs" tables that follow. The sample is well described by
looking at three areas: what pay-grade the individuals
were, as shown in Table V; what community the individuals
represented, depicted in Table VI; and whether they had
attended LiMET School, shown in Table VII.
This study required a differentiation of the average and
superior performers. There were varying opinions among
commanders, interviewers and readers about which inter-
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this study clearly average was defined as having all three
votes in the average category. Likewise, clearly superior
was defined as three votes for superior. Data from inter-
viewees who had mixed votes of superior and average was not
used since the evidence concerning their performance was
inconclusive. By using the "crosstabs" procedure, 27 clearly
superior and 28 clearly average performers were found, as
shown in Table VIII.
TABLE VIII
Summary of Average/Superior Ratings Using All Ratings
Evaluations^ Absolute Relative Corrected













Where CO = Commander, INT = Interviewer, RE = Reader
and where S = Superior, A = Average
A word about the significance figures that appear in the
tables may be helpful here. Without going into the details
of how the SPSS Program computes chi-square statistics, it
can be simply stated that the chi-square test helps to
determine whether a systematic relationship exists between
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variables. The lower the chi-square value, the more chance
there is that the variables are independent (i.e., that the
variation of one does not explain the variation in the
other) . Conversely, as chi-square becomes large, the chances
that the variables are related increase. The significance
figures shown in the tables of this thesis represent the
chance that variables are independent. For example: a
significance of .01 means that there is 1 chance in 100 that
the variables are not related. The significance level is
often referred to as the "alpha- level" of the test. For
this thesis, an alpha of .05 has arbitrarily been chosen as
a reasonable level of significance from which sound conclu-
sions may be drawn. A caution on the chi-square test is that
it does not measure the strength of any relationship that
may exist, and it should not be interpreted as such. The
strengths of relationships are explored later in this chapter
using Pearson's "r" [Ref. 25: p. 223-224].
In examining the differences between average and superior
performance, crosstabulations revealed that LMET training was
not a factor in determining individuals ' ratings as average
or superior performers. In fact, LMET education was a random
factor in superior/average ratings, as shown by the signifi-
cance figures in Table IX.
Next, each type of delegation, i.e., each behavioral
indicator, was evaluated to determine whether LMET or average/
























as determined by Chi-square figures with 1 degree
of freedom
The clearly average and clearly superior performers were
categorized with respect to whether they used delegation and
which behavioral indicator showed its use. A summary of
this data is provided in Tables X through XIII, below. The
significance figures provided therewith show that there was
a wide variation in the characteristics of the people who
used the competency, no matter which behavioral indicator
was exhibited.
Further evaluations were performed to determine which
types of delegation were used in conjunction with other
types. This data, however, was better gleaned from the
first data arrangement which was presented in Table IV.
Finally, linear regression analyses (Pearson correlations)
were run on some data elements. Regression is an attempt to
fit a line to the data points. In linear regression a























































Chi-Square = 2.52 with 2 degrees freedom:
Significance = .2837
Behavioral Indicator A is "Clearly assigns authority".
Given these observations, there does not seem to be
a significant relationship between Behavioral Indicator
A and superior performance. Nor, does LMET appear to
influence superior/average performance where this



















































Chi-Square = 1.417 with 2 degrees freedom:
Significance = .4924
Behavioral Indicator B is "Uses chain of command".
Given these observations, there does not seem to be
a significant relationship between Behavioral Indicator
B and superior performance. Nor, does LMET appear to
influence superior/average performance where this

















































Chi-Square = 1.29 2 with 2 degrees freedom;
Significance = .5241
Behavioral Indicator C is "Encourages others—Avoids
direct orders".
Given these observations, there does not seem to be
a significant relationship between Behavioral Indicator
C and superior performance. Nor, does LMET appear to
influence superior/average performance where this















































Chi-Square = 0.0 with 1 degree freedom:
Significance = 1.0
Behavioral Indicator D is "Controls 'Do it yourself*
urge"
.
Given these observations, there does not seem to be a
significant relationship between Behavioral Indicator
D and superior performance. Nor, does LMET appear to
influence superior/average performance where this
behavioral indicator is concerned.
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measured to see how "good" that fit is. Again, without going
into the statistical derivations, SPSS produces an r-value
which is a measure of "goodness of fit". R-values will fall
in a range between -1.0 and +1.0 , with values approaching
either extreme indicating a good fit (a strong relationship
between the variables) and values close to zero indicating
a poor fit. If the r-value is squared, a more easily inter-
preted measure of association is produced. R-squared is
literally said to be the proportion of variation in one
variable that is explained by the other variable [Ref. 25:
p. 276-280]. The statistical significance of the r-values
can be interpreted in the same manner as the chi-square
significance figures.
Pearson correlations were run to determine whether values
of one element could partially explain or be used to predict
the values of another. The types of delegation as determined
by which behavioral indicator was observed, the three (com-
manders', interviewers', and readers') evaluations of
superior/average, a consolidated (clearly) superior/average
rating, and LMET graduation/non-attendance were regressed
against one another. This met with minimal success in that
several of the regressions were found to be statistically
significant (alpha = .0 5) , but most of the highest signifi-
cant r-values were found among the voting data rather than
between the competency types and the votes or LMET . Some
regression figures are presented in Table XIV. Conclusions















































































Total evaluation, i.e., clearly superior
or average
Commander ' s evaluation of superior or
average
Reader's evaluation of superior or average
Interviewer's evaluation of superior or
average
Clearly Assigns Authority
Uses Chain of Command
Encourages Others—Avoids Direct Orders
Controls "Do it Yourself" Urge





This study of delegation provided great insight into the
culture and operation of the United States Navy, especially
for the authors, two Army officers, who had little association
with Navy customs and procedures. Unfortunately, the study
did not produce the expected results as far as the relation-
ships between delegation and LMET training or superior per-
formers are concerned. Perhaps some of those expectations
were molded out of a lack of previous experience with the
Navy, but most developed logically from the examination of
a system that placed a value on leadership and attempted to
*
instruct' managers within that system on how to use the dele-
gation competency, with the intention of improving the
managers' performances.
The relationship that was expected to be strongest was
between graduation from LMET and the use of the delegation
competency. However, as evidenced by the tables in the
previous chapter and the regressions run between LMET and
each behavioral indicator, that relationship was very weak.
In three of the four cases the regression coefficients were
so small that they told nothing. They were also insignifi-
cant, so that any relationship which may have been present
in the sample could not be used as an indicator of the popu-
lation's parameters. The one regression that was significant
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was between LMET and the fourth behavioral indicator, "Con-
trols the urge to do it yourself and, instead manages others
to carry out the responsibilities which have been assigned
to them". Surprisingly, this regression coefficient was
negative, indicating a slight tendency for those who attended
LMET to do things themselves rather than delegate. LMET
attendance though, accounted for only about 3% of the variation
in the use of delegation, as indicated by this behavioral
indicator. This is supported by the absolute numbers that
appear in Table XI.
This study of delegation arose from a competency based
model that maintained there was a positive relationship be-
tween the use of delegation and superior performance in the
Navy. The data in the study, however, does not support a
strong relationship. Superior performers did not use the
delegation competency more than average performers. Nor
did superior ratings correlate well with any behavioral
indicator. Because this finding counters the McBer conclu-
sions, several extra regressions were attempted with the
average/superior ratings and the behavioral indicators.
Not only were the clearly average and clearly superior ratings
compared with each behavioral indicator, but composite measures
of the delegation competency were constructed and regressed
with superior/average ratings. These additional attempts
added little new information. Small significant correlations
were initially found between the reader's rating and behavioral
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indicator D. These small relationships were born out in
the composite indices where clearly superior performance
was minimally explained by behavioral indicators C and D.
But, the maximum amount of variance explained in any of
these situations is 10%. This is not a sufficient explanation
to be conclusive, particularly when viewed with the limita-
tions of the study which are discussed later in this chapter.
As a spin-off of this study, a comparison between LMET
graduates and the superior/average ratings was made. It was
found that LMET graduates were equally distributed among the
superior/average performers. While one might expect that
LMET training would increase the chance that an individual
would be rated superior, it could be countered that an even
distribution of superior and average performers among LMET
graduates is reasonable. The logic includes the facts that:
A) the Navy's goal is to have all personnel in leadership
positions (both average and superior) attend LMET, and B) that
average personnel are sent to LMET as well as superior per-
formers. This ignores the situations where marginal per-
formers are sent to LMET training in order to improve their
performance to an "average" level. The fact that delegation
is taught in LMET but not used in daily performance could
also be used to suggest that the Navy is an unfavorable
environment in which to practice the skills learned in LMET.
The style of the interviews used to gather data for this
study leads to another point about the relative importance
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the interviewees attached to delegation. Non-directive inter-
viewing allowed the participants to raise subjects and actions
that were important to them, that they were especially con-
scious of, and that they could remember at the time of the
interview. Delegation came up in only 2 7.8 percent of the
incidents, where some competencies appeared in a much higher
percentage of the incidents. The self-control competency,
for instance, appeared in 10 percent of the incidents.
Thus, delegation was not as important to the middle managers
interviewed as some other aspects of their jobs.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The major conclusions of this study, then, are as follows:
First, the authors conclude that there is no relation-
ship in the Navy between superior performance and the dele-
gation competency.
Second, it can be said that LMET attendance is not
related to superior performance or the use of the delegation
competency.
Lastly, the study points out that the Navy's middle
managers accept delegation as a routine, rather than as a
discretionary tool to be consciously applied.
C. PROBLEMS WITH THE STUDY
While some readers might accept the above conclusions out
of hand, the discerning will raise criticisms which range
from attacks on the sampling procedures to discourses on the
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McBer technique. The authors concur that some areas of the
study could have been strengthened.
Of primary concern is the question of how appropriate the
McBer technique is to the study of just one competency.
Where McBer used the technique to build a complete model,
the authors were interested in only a small portion of the
available data. It is a less than comprehensive study in this
regard. The interview technique allowed the interviewees
to choose subjects which were important to them (or maybe
subjects that they could think of at the time) , but did not
focus on the subject of delegation. More directive inter-
views would have increased the validity of the data. Since
no one was asked specifically about delegation or about how
and when it was used, there would appear to be a vast opinion
pool that is missing from the data. Yet, it was not intended
that opinions be gathered, but rather, actions. The actual
data gap came about by using the project design of the
heterogeneous workgroup project and attempting to extract
more specific information on a smaller area than was origin-
ally planned. While this does not invalidate the study, it
suggests that more conclusive results could be obtained
through redesign.
Further questions on the execution of McBer 's technique
weaken other conclusions of the study. McBer supported their
model by administering back-up surveys to a large sample,
i.e., over a thousand managers. They used that data to
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confirm the results of the interviews and validate the compe-
tency model they developed. In this study, no such back-up
data was gathered or evaluated. These departures from the
McBer philosophy decrease the significance of any conclusions
drawn from this thesis, or for that matter, from the hetero-
geneous workgroup project itself. Daniel Goleman describes
the use of peer group ratings and the administering of criti-
cal decisions tests to another sample group as elements of
McBer' s competency testing—elements which were absent in
this study [Ref. 11: p. 36].
Another similar issue which could be attacked is inter-
rater reliability. McBer used the critical decisions tests
to eliminate competencies which were not appropriate for the
Navy's model, allowing the different sample of managers to
validate the information. In lieu of using a new and differ-
ent sample, this study had an independent coder recode the
interview transcripts in order to validate the model. The
independent coder had a success ratio of over 50 percent,
but there were no efforts to eliminate competencies which did
not appear in all coding sets. This factor will cause some
discriminating readers to conclude that this study is thus
limited.
One article on competency tests said, "Neither McBer nor
its clients have so far produced much empirical proof that
their method does, in fact, lead to demonstrable improvements
in job performance" [Ref. 11: p. 46]. Similarly, readers of
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this study will conclude from it that there is no empirical
proof that the delegation competency is a characteristic of
superior performers. The inaccuracies inherent in any subjec-
tive study are obvious here, as well. In viewing the behavioral
indicators of the delegation competency, it is often the case
that the categories overlap. This is evidenced by the signi-
ficant relationships found when correlating the behavioral
indicators with one another. The lack of independence of
these indicators suggests that there is some difficulty in
separating the manner in which people use and/or code the
delegation competency. The study in its subjectivity, how-
ever, cannot support the opposing positions either. For in-
stance, one cannot maintain with this data that the delegation
competency is not a characteristic of superior performers, or
that average performers possess the competency in the same
quantities as their higher rated counterparts.
Another area of concern is the adequacy of the sample.
As with many similar studies, time and money were constraints
during the information gathering phase. Because of this, the
sample size was limited, and the sample selection by lacking
randomness, was biased. An increase in sample size, of
course, would have improved the believability of any correla-
tions which were run. Biases on the other hand, are more
difficult to deal with. Allowing commanders or their repre-
sentatives to choose the interviewees affected the results,
as did the dependence on geographical location and availability
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of interviewees. Further, the sample composition which in-
cludes ensigns and junior petty officers, affected the out-
come of the study. It is entirely possible that such junior
managers are not called upon to use the delegation competency
as often as more senior managers, or that they are not in
positions that allow significant amounts of delegation.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the conclusions of this study, the authors' per-
sonal experiences lead them to believe that delegation is
an important part of a leader's job. The fact that McBer '
s
model included delegation as a competency of superior per-
formers adds strong support to this view.
This raises a question about whether the delegation compe-
tency was sufficiently isolated in this study to be examined
in such depth. That is, can one competency be separated from
the McBer framework, and was an adequate job of that separa-
tion accomplished? Particularly in the context of the
Navy's training goal, it follows that if a competency is not
separately observable, it is perhaps not separately educable.
With this in mind, further study of delegation is recommended,
as follows:
1. Use a larger and stratified sample of 0-3 's and above
for officers, and E-7's and above for enlisteds. The authors
feel this will improve the confidence in the observations be-
cause it is possible that supervisors in larger organizations
use delegation more than in smaller units.
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2. A different sample chosen by position would also be
appropriate, since a supervisor needs subordinates to whom
responsibilities may be delegated. Here, methods of coding
the scope of each position would have to be developed.
3. Other techniques for study, which differ from McBer's
method are warranted. Opinion surveys, for instance would
provide more conclusive results.
4. Evaluations of the environments in which delegation
is used most would add to a greater understanding of the com-
petency. Such things as the organizational structure and
policies are good points of departure. This study ignored
such environmental issues as whether delegation is an appro-
priate response in the face of crisis, or whether persons
who are in autonomous positions tend to delegate more.
5. The various aspects of institutional delegation (i.e.,




Future studies of any competencies should be under-
taken only after careful consideration of the methodology
to be employed, and with a more strict adherence to the
selected procedures.
Because the authors did not study the specifics of LMET
and how it conducts training on the delegation competency
(i.e., before and after training tests on how much one subject
delegates) , it is beyond the scope of this study to suggest
revisions to the LMET Program. In fact, the authors feel
that training on delegation is quite important to tomorrow's
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leaders. Quick fixes on the education system as a result of
this study are therefore, not called for.
Overall, the authors think that their observations and
conclusions are heavily skewed by environmental factors well
outside of the training arena. Navy leaders do not delegate
because the new young sailors they have to supervise are not
yet delegable. Higher in the chain, delegation fails be-
cause seniors manage with too much detail, believing that
the little mistakes cost too dearly in promotion considera-
tions. In the long run, it is a relaxing of the environ-
mental constraints that will allow delegation to flourish.
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